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to have cultural influence, then the philosopher had to make his work 
accessible to a wider public. The diffusion of such knowledge was a neces- 
sary precondition for democratic social reconstruction. 
The popularization of pragmatism in the period after the First World War 
helped to create a new form of pragmatism, "middle-ground" pragmatism. If 
middlebrow culture attempted to balance demands for accessibility with 
quality and to reconcile authority with democracy, then middle-ground popu- 
lar pragmatists wanted to retain the essentials of pragmatism as developed by 
Dewey while being open to new thinkers and concepts, especially those of 
George Santayana nd the "tragic sense of life."3 While continuing through- 
out the mid- 1920s to speak in the familiar language of social reconstruction, 
critical intelligence, and scientific method, middle-ground pragmatists in- 
creasingly emphasized a stance of moderation and distance later made fa- 
mous in Walter Lippmann's A Preface to Morals (1929). 
Middle-ground pragmatists also helped to define the chastened liberal- 
ism that dominated American intellectual life in the late 1940s and 1950s. It 
has become a commonplace in charting the history of American intellectuals 
to focus on how Reinhold Niebuhr, Daniel Bell, Lionel Trilling, and others, 
out of disillusionment with Marxism, adopted a new form of liberalism 
marked by irony, restraint, and disdain for utopian visions of social recon- 
struction. Rather than intending to refute the importance of this sea-change in 
thought, this essay suggests that middle-ground pragmatists antedated the 
move toward chastened liberalism by well over a decade, without any 
sustained engagement with radical politics.4 
Middle-ground pragmatism proved to be an appealing position because it 
allowed young intellectuals to popularize philosophical ideas and to battle 
against the insufficiencies of American cultural ife in the 1 920s. As much a 
style of thinking as a specific philosophy, middle-ground pragmatism com- 
municated philosophical knowledge and presented political positions in an 
ecumenical and non-threatening manner. The moderate liberalism and con- 
templative style of middle-ground pragmatism furthered its authors' cultural 
credibility and authority without alienating audiences with the shrillness of 
partisan politics. By the late 1920s and early 1930s the perspective of popular 
pragmatism was nestled between the exuberant democratic pragmatism of 
Dewey and the elitist distance of Lippmann, between the vitalism of James 
and the passivity of Santayana. 
I Henry Samuel Levinson, Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life (Chapel 
Hill, 1992). See also Richard Wightman Fox, "Tragedy, Responsibility, and the American 
Intellectual, 1925-1950," in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas P. Hughes 
and Agatha C. Hughes (New York, 1990). 
4 On the chastened liberalism of a later generation, see Neil Jumonville, Critical 
Crossings: The New York Intellectuals in Postwar America (Berkeley, 1991), 102-50. See 
also Thomas Bender, "Lionel Trilling and American Culture," American Quarterly, 42 
(1990), 324-47. 
ge kin
o e tural fluence, en e ilosopher o e is k
ible er lic. fusion owledge es-
y econdit on or ocratic l econstruction.
larization agmatism e iod ter he st ld
l ed o eate orm agmatism, iddle-ground" agmatism.
iddlebrow lture tempted o ce ands or ibility th
ity o econcile hority th ocracy, en iddle-ground -
agmatist ted o etain e tials agmatism eloped
ile g o inkers cepts, ial y ose
ge ayana he ragic se fe."3 ile tinuing hrough-
he id- 20s o he a iliar guage ial econstruction,
itical telligence, tific ethod, iddle-ground agmatist -
easingly phasized ance oderation stance er ade a-
ous er ann's face o als ).
le-ground agmatist lped o fine he astened eral-
hat inated erican tellectual fe he e s 0s.
s e onplace arting he istory erican tellectuals
o ocus hold uhr, l , el il ing, hers,
illusionment th xism, ted orm eralism
arked ony, estraint, isdain or opian isions ial econ-
ruction. her han tending o efute he portance his change
hought, his gests hat iddle-ground agmatist tedated he
ove o ard astened eralism ll r ade, ithout
stained gagement ith adical litics.4
le-ground agmatism oved o ealing ition a se
ed oung tellectuals o ularize ilosophical eas d o ttle
i st he suf ic encies erican ltural l fe he s. uch
yle hinking ecific ilosophy, iddle-ground agmatism -
unicated ilosophical nowledge esented litical itions
enical on-threatening anner. e oderate eralism d -
e plative yle iddle-ground agmatism urther d ts thors' ltural
edibil ty d thority ithout ating iences ith he rillness
tisan litics. he te 0s d ly 0s he rspective ular
agmatism estled twe n he berant ocratic ragmatism
d he itist istance an , twe n he italism ames
d he sivity tayana.
3 ry uel i son, tayana, atism, he iritual e el
ll, 2). ard i htman , agedy, onsibil ty, d he erican
tel ectual, -1950," is ford: lic tel ectual, . o as . hes
d atha hes k, 0).
4 he astened i eralism er e eration, il umonville, itical
ossings: he ork tel ectuals n ar erica keley, 91), 2-50.
o as der, el il ing d erican lture," erican terly,
(1990),324-47.
Philosophy in American Culture 285 
Middle-ground pragmatists boasted highly respectable academic creden- 
tials. Durant, Randall, and Edman all received their Ph.D. degrees in philoso- 
phy from Columbia University; Randall and Edman continued to affiliate 
with the Columbia program, and each eventually headed the Department of 
Philosophy. Kallen studied with James (and Santayana) at Harvard and 
taught first at the University of Wisconsin before going to the New School 
for Social Research. In the 1920s Kallen collaborated with Dewey on a 
proposed project to examine the nature of American individualism. While 
Dewey withdrew from the project, Kallen completed it in a Deweyan spirit. 
Overstreet received his degrees from the University of California t Berkeley 
and Oxford, and for many years he chaired the philosophy program at City 
College in New York City. But he, too, was a devotee of Dewey.5 Finally, 
Smith received his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Chicago, where 
he spent many years teaching. Although a genial eclectic in his perspective, 
he was comfortable with the pragmatic perspective and identified Dewey, 
Mead, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as formative influences.6 
These popular philosophers, especially in their early work, drew from the 
thought of the pragmatic tradition. But pragmatism is not easily defined. 
H. S. Thayer effectively sums up pragmatism as "a theory of inquiry and 
judgment for which the logical characteristics and operations that issue in 
knowledge and in moral valuation and decision are integrally related." This 
definition plausibly captures the meaning and action continuum central to 
pragmatism. It misses, however, the cultural resonance of the pragmatist 
tradition in America. Here Richard Bernstein is more helpful by specifying 
anti-foundationalism, thefallible nature of truth, the social nature of the self, 
the importance of inquiry, and pluralism as the "constellation" of pragmatist 
ideas. From yet another angle pragmatism is a philosophical perspective 
closely intertwined with faith in science as an experimental method and open 
to revision in the light of the richness of experience. Dewey captured these 
imperatives with such terms as the "creative intelligence" and "warranted 
assertibility." The popular pragmatists worked within the outlines of these 
definitions of pragmatism and, in the process, helped to make pragmatism 
central to the conversation of American culture from the 1920s until the 
1 940s.7 
I Biographical information on these philosophers is in American Philosophy Today 
and Tomorrow, ed. Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook (1935, Freeport, New York; rpt. 
1968). On the Columbia University connection, see John Herman Randall, Jr., "The 
Department of Philosophy," in A History of the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia Univer- 
sity (New York, 1957), 102-45. Rubin in The Making of Middlebrow Culture interprets 
Durant as an idealist. For Durant as a pragmatist see Raymond Frey, William James 
Durant: An Intellectual Biography (Lewiston, N.Y., 1989), 37-47. 
6 Smith, A Non-Existent Man (Austin, 1962). 
7Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (Indianapolis, 1968), 
ix; Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/ 
Postmodernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 326-29. On the cultural context of pragmatism 
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Special conditions influenced the popularization of knowledge after the 
First World War. The 1 920s were the great age of popularization. Although 
many values were wounded by the war, called into question by demographic 
shifts, or undermined by the development of industrial society, the value of 
education to liberate remained triumphant, a democratic article of faith for 
most Americans. The thirsting after knowledge on the part of the populace 
was not only satisfied but also increased by the variety of new modes of 
information. The communication explosion- larger format newspapers, new 
magazines, radio, and other forms of mass culture-mixed education with 
entertainment.8 As Dewey remarked in The Public and Its Problems (1927), 
democracy "will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indis- 
solubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication."9 
Yet in the culture of the 1920s, the dissemination of ideas sometimes 
appeared as another form of crass consumerism. The casual ability to quote 
Spinoza or to display Durant's The Story of Philosophy on a coffee table 
became symbols of status and knowledge. Popular philosophy, like the 
popularization of knowledge generally in this period, could provide the data 
for cocktail party conversations, for would-be Jay Gatsbys trying to break 
into the high-society life of the mind. 
Middlebrow mania for popularization, however, also allowed large num- 
bers of reasonably educated Americans to pick their way through a mound of 
information with the help of experts who sought to separate the wheat from 
the chaff of literature, to condense the maddening crescendo of change into 
useful outlines, and to moderate between genteel and modernistic visions of 
culture. As Rubin notes, in the 1920s the number of college graduates had 
risen "from a half-million to more than one million," and high school 
enrollment in the same period more than doubled.'0 While impossible to be 
assured about the audience that the popular pragmatists reached, they wanted 
to communicate with these newly minted college and high school graduates. 
In the opinions of reviewers the popular pragmatists often hit their mark, but 
one thoughtful commentator wondered "whether the persons who have read 
these books [of popular philosophy] have thereby increased their intelligence 
and understanding of science. We ought, at any rate, to give thanks to 
see David A. Hollinger, "The Problem of Pragmatism in American History," In the 
American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas (Bloomington, 
1985), 23-43. 
8 Warren I. Susman, Culture As History: The Transformation of American Society in 
the Twentieth Century (New York, 1984), 105-21. 
9 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927) in The Later Works, 1925-1953 
(Carbondale, Ill., 1988), 350. 
'0 Rubin, Middlebrow Culture, 31. See also David 0. Levine, The American College 
and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915-1940 (Ithaca, 1986). 
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publishers and authors who are sufficiently adventurous to experiment with 
any means to satisfy the intellectual itches of potential earners."''1 
Success at popularization for these philosophers began most famously 
with Durant's chatty, anecdotal best seller, The Story ofPhilosophy (1926). 12 
Popular works of philosophy by academically trained philosophers quickly 
became common coin in the publishing realm throughout he 1920s. 
Randall's The Making of the Modern Mind (1926) joined The Story of 
Philosophy as a selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club. At the close of the 
1920s Randall published a massive tome on the development of the modem 
world. Edman produced a staggering range of publications, including a 
novel, an analysis of human nature, poetry, and a work on aesthetics. In this 
heady decade of popularization, Kallen published influential collections of 
essays on cultural pluralism and other topics (many of which first appeared in 
The Saturday Review of Books, The New Republic, and The American 
Mercury), and Overstreet became famous for his own best-selling "how-to" 
books on psychology. Finally, Smith not only authored many books and 
articles, he became a radio personality broadcasting philosophy through is 
"University of the Air" program. 
The general contexts of a crisis of authority and a need to respond to the 
desire for information on the part of an increasingly educated audience 
certainly helped to shape the themes and style of the popular pragmatists. A
reviewer ecognized that in the wake of the First World War, in the midst of 
economic turmoil and massive social change, popular works of philosophy 
responded to "the demand for the reorientation of ourselves in relation to 
reality ... because of the collapse of the world-view inherited from the 
nineteenth century."'3 As Edman phrased it in "Philosophy for the Lawless" 
(1925), increased interest in popular philosophy represented "a search for a 
saving and reconstructive wisdom. From disrespect for the old foolish laws, 
we are turning to look for some law of reason to regulate our lives."'4 
Another, more specific context helped to mold popular pragmatism. By 
the second decade of the twentieth century professional philosophy had 
become increasingly concerned with technical issues of epistemology and 
with problems in the philosophy of science. This technical turn was largely a
response to a perceived crisis in philosophy. In the eyes of some, philosophy 
II Eduard C. Lindeman, Review of Overstreet, Influencing Human Behavior in New 
Republic, 40 (26 May 1926), 40. Even the humanist critic Stuart Sherman praised popular 
philosophy; see his "Philosophy and the Average Man's Adult Education," New York 
Herald Tribune Books, 2 (20 June 1926), 1-3. 
12 On The Story of Philosophy, see Rubin, The Making of Middlebrow Culture, ch. 5; 
James D. Hart, The Popular Book: A History of America's Literary Taste (New York, 
1950), 239; New York Herald Tribune Books, 2 (6 Feb. 1927), 20; 3 (30 Jan. 1927), 13. 
13 Review of The Enduring Quest in The Christian Century, 48 (6 May 1931), 615. 
14 Edman, "Philosophy for the Lawless," Bookman, 60 (Feb. 1925), 693. 
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had relinquished its once exalted status as the queen of the sciences, de- 
throned by the physical and biological sciences and even threatened by its 
one time sub-discipline, psychology. Philosophy, once closely tied to theol- 
ogy and metaphysics and anchored in the pieties of an earlier century, had 
lost status. Some sought o retain philosophical credibility by employing the 
technical anguage of science, along with a rigorous logic. To hasten this 
transformation, philosophers increasingly specialized within the profession, 
publishing papers for other scholars in the rapidly expanding number of 
journals or presenting papers at scholarly conferences. In distancing itself 
from a public role, philosophy attempted to validate its professional creden- 
tials, develop its own special problems, and standardize and scientize its 
language and methodology for the solution of a new set of concerns.'5 
The vanity that philosophical analysis could be somehow abstracted from 
public life appalled Dewey and his followers. Dewey had, most famously in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), protested against over-reliance on 
"epistemological puzzles" which alienated many from philosophy. Dewey 
proclaimed that, in place of barren epistemology, "the task of future philoso- 
phy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own 
day. Its aim is to become as far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing 
with these conflicts."'6 Alas, Dewey's turgid prose prevented him from 
effectively communicating his ideas to as wide an audience as he deserved. 
But he was sadly aware that "philosophic writing is often so specialized and 
technical that even educated readers, unless professionally trained, are re- 
pelled rather than attracted."''7 
Durant attempted to expose the dangers of epistemology and to make 
philosophy address social and moral conflicts in a lively manner. Alone 
among the popular philosophers, Durant practiced his philosophical reflec- 
tion outside a university setting. In his first and most pragmatistic book, 
Philosophy and the Social Problem (1916), Durant condemned the "epis- 
temologs," who he felt dominated the discipline of philosophy. Informed 
action rather than pure theory was demanded of philosophy. Philosophy must 
be evaluated for its "vital use to the community" in the task of reconstruc- 
tion. '8 
Durant's writings of the 1920s continued with these familiar pragmatic 
cavils against epistemology. Epistemological issues received short shrift in 
1' Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1860-1930 (New Haven, 1977), 451-80; Daniel J. Wilson, Science, Community, and the 
Transformation of American Philosophy, 1860-1930 (Chicago, 1990), 149-82. 
16 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) in The Middle Works, 1899-1924 
(Carbondale,Ill., 1988), 150, 94. Dewey did not ignore epistemology, see Ralph W. 
Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New 
Haven, 1986). On Dewey as arch anti-epistemologist ee Richard Rorty, Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979). 
17 Dewey, "Foreword" to Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York, 1926), n.p. 
18 Durant, Philosophy and the Social Problem (New York, 1928), 216, 219. 
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The Story of Philosophy (Leibniz was ignored, Locke presented perfuncto- 
rily), while Kant and Descartes were examined not as epistemologists but as 
moral philosophers. In contrast, political and social thinkers such as Voltaire 
received more attention and praise. Durant concluded the volume by an- 
nouncing that "Philosophy, like everything else, must secularize itself; it 
must stay on the earth and earn its keep by illuminating life.... A philosophy 
so understood might at last produce philosophers worthy to be kings."'9 
Overstreet agreed with Durant and Dewey that philosophy must move 
away from technical and unresolvable pistemological problems. Overstreet 
found modem academic philosophers often misled into believing that com- 
prehension of "the ontological disquisitions of Descartes ... or the fantastical 
cosmologizing of Leibnitz" made one a real philosopher. Philosophy must 
be defined widely and understood as the attainment of greater wisdom. 
Overstreet imagined a sourcebook for philosophy where the familiar figures 
of Plato and Spinoza (like Durant he ignored Leibniz and Descartes) were 
joined by "the Shaws, Ibsens and Shakespeares, the Montaignes, Whitmans, 
Thomas Hardys and Mark Twains." Anyone was a philosopher "who has 
thought greatly, understandingly, about this business of life."20 
Concerted attack on the conceits of professional philosophy did not bring 
forth the enmity of their professional brethren upon the heads of the middle- 
ground pragmatists. With the exception of Durant the popular philosophers 
were well-situated within the academy. Their books were usually reviewed 
positively in professional journals. Their ideas were further promoted by 
control of the important Journal of Philosophy, where the work of Edman, 
Randall, and others regularly appeared. In addition, Smith served for many 
years as editor of The International Journal of Ethics published out of the 
University of Chicago. In Kuhnian terms, while these philosophers were 
opposing a developing paradigm within the discipline of philosophy, 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, they maintained powerful institutional nd 
editorial connections that allowed their work to live both within and outside 
the academy. Academic connections actually lent an air of status and author- 
ity to their popularizations.A 
19 Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 574-75. 
20 Overstreet, "Can Philosophy Come Back?," The Freeman, 8 (12 Dec. 1923), 324- 
35. 
21 Of course not all philosophers were favorably impressed by this work. See the 
negative reviews by Mortimer Adler, "Sleight of Hand," Nation, 123 (29 Sept. 1926), 
298-99; 1255 (12 Oct. 1927), 380-82, and Paul Weiss, "Human, All Too Human," New 
Republic, 47 (28 July 1926), 286. Favorable reviews are Stuart Sherman, "Philosophy and 
the Average Man's Education," 1-3; Ernest Sutherland Bates, "The Beauty of Philoso- 
phy," Saturday Review of Literature, 2 (3 July 1926), 899; and A. A. Roback, "Review," 
The Philosophical Review, 36 (1927), 191-92. 
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Until the middle 1920s these philosophers labored comfortably in the 
pragmatist tradition. Edman's dissertation, published as Human Traits and 
their Social Significance (1920) was deeply pragmatist in style and assump- 
tions. It was also highly popular, becoming a required text for the famous 
Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia University. Edman's pragma- 
tism brought ogether James's psychology and Dewey's ideals of education, 
social reconstruction, and scientific method. Edman concluded his text in 
Deweyan fashion: "Education ... is the instrument through which the young 
can be educated not only to ideals and customs already current, but to their 
reflective modification in the light of our ever-growing knowledge of the 
conditions of human welfare."22 
No popular philosopher of the period dazzled more with his learning and 
expressed pragmatic ideals more fully than John Herman Randall, Jr., who 
published The Problem of Group Responsibility to Society (his 1922 Colum- 
bia University dissertation), The Making of the Modern Mind (1926, his most 
popular) and Our Changing Civilization (1929, in large part a rehash of 
themes in the earlier works).23 These books exuded immense erudition and 
authority, especially remarkable since Randall was only in his twenties 
during this decade. 
The origin of The Making of the Modern Mind was, as with Edman's 
book, tied to the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia University 
in the 1 920s. Randall was one of the primary instructors for the course, which 
was designed, in Deweyan fashion, to introduce students to contemporary 
problems with an eye toward the intelligent reconstruction fsociety accord- 
ing to scientific and humane principles. The Making of the Modern Mind was 
written and organized for accessibility, with clearly outlined chapters and 
separate topic headings. Each chapter conveniently concluded with "Select- 
ed Reading Lists" broken down by subject for readers to pursue further, 
independent study. 
The Making of the Modern Mind and Our Changing Civilization effec- 
tively claimed that intelligent reconstruction might overcome tensions be- 
tween tradition and modernity- "Our machinery is modern; but our institu- 
tions are medieval."24 Randall worried that peasant "folkways" inhibited 
adjustment and progress. Hope for the future of society lay in continued 
scientific advancement and the withering away of unworthy, traditional 
22 Edman, Human Traits and their Social Significance (Boston, 1920), 459; Justus 
Buchler, "Reconstruction in the Liberal Arts" in A History of Columbia College on 
Morningside, ed. Dwight C. Miner (New York, 1954), 100-101. 
23 Although Randall has often been identified more as a naturalist han a pragmatist in 
his philosophy, he noted that "my own philosophizing is judged, I believe, and probably 
rightly, to be a pushing of certain aspects-the more metaphysical and realistic aspects-of 
John Dewey's." See Randall, "Towards a Functional Naturalism," in Contemporary 
American Philosophy, ed. J. E. Smith (London, 1970), 60. 
24 Randall, Our Changing Civilization (New York, 1929), 7. 
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beliefs.25 Yet Randall was neither a technocrat nor a booster of business 
civilization. Although traditional religions were riddled with superstition a d 
prejudice, Randall maintained that a combination of faith, education, and the 
creative intelligence should direct the development of human society: "We 
need faith ... faith that the best that is old can be embodied in one life with the 
promise of the new." This would be achieved in Deweyan fashion by 
working to "devise more adequate means for bringing intelligence to bear on 
the organization of the new civilization."26 
While Overstreet identified himself with Dewey's pragmatism, he 
stressed that social reconstruction-the "bringing intelligence to bear on the 
organization of the new civilization"-must begin with the individual. 
Immensely confident and glib, Overstreet sought to become a doctor for the 
lost souls of America- those individuals unable to clear their minds, to gain 
an understanding of their "true" selves. To be sure, Overstreet was an 
inspiring teacher, blessed with massive reserves of good will and humor. If 
Dewey was to be the prophet of social reconstruction through an understand- 
ing of modem psychology, then Overstreet seemed perfectly content o be the 
crown prince for a psychological reconstruction fthe individual. 
Both Influencing Human Behavior (1926) and About Ourselves (1927) 
were brilliant works of popularization in the pragmatic mode. Written in a 
highly colloquial tone, Overstreet's books attempted to make the reader feel 
as if he or she were present at a lecture. Overstreet borrowed from an eclectic 
range of thinkers, behaviorists such as Watson and Pavlov, Freudian theorists 
(he actually preferred Alfred Adler's emphasis upon the self as motivated by 
a desire for respect rather than sexual gratification), James, for his emphasis 
upon the constructive role of habit formation, and Dewey, for his familiar 
characterization of mind as a seeker after ends. In the process Overstreet 
papered over technical disagreements with infectious enthusiasm designed to 
promote mental health more than psychological synthesis. 
Technique in these books often overwhelmed content. Overstreet offered 
a door-to-door salesman's banter as an effective xample of how to get 
people's attention. Influencing Human Behavior explained how capturing the 
interest of listeners was a key to successful public speaking and how striking 
metaphors made for compelling writing. Even science and philosophy be- 
came appealing when the writer on these subjects avoided the dull facts of the 
past and began "at the point where philosophy makes a difference."27 
25 Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston, 1926), 5. 
26 Randall, Our Changing Civilization, 359-61. See also Randall, "Effects of Science 
and Industry on Religion," Current History, 30 (1929), 355-62. In Why Religion, Kallen 
also attributed many religious problems to the development of an industrial, urban society. 
Kallen treated the crisis of individualism as a function of the same technological, demo- 
graphic shift. Kallen, Why Religion (New York, 1927) and Individualism: An American 
Way of Life (New York, 1933). 
27 Overstreet, Influencing Human Behavior (1926, New York; rpt. 1953), 118. 
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Scientists and philosophers influenced human behavior, according to Over- 
street, by "capturing attention," by revising the habits of individuals in a 
desired direction, and by "deliberately setting out to develop in ourselves 
and in others the creative type of mind." Such maxims were reminiscent of 
the ideas that William James had set forth in the famous chapter on habit in 
his The Principles of Psychology (1890).28 
Overstreet's popular psychology places him among the cultists of per- 
sonality that historians view as central to the 1920s. According to this 
hypothesis, personality came to replace character as the mark of the modem 
individual able most successfully to fit the demands of a consumer society.29 
Yet Overstreet tried to avoid such consequences. Reviews of his work in both 
popular and professional journals were invariably favorable, emphasizing 
how Influencing Human Behavior was not concerned with the goal of "self- 
aggrandizement." Although his insights could be used for selfish purposes, 
he was seen as helping individuals develop values that would aid society. 
About Ourselves was largely devoted to giving individuals the confidence to 
overcome repression and prejudice and to even "increase our sales resis- 
tance." Overstreet simply hoped that his ideas might help individuals "to 
search out the psychological and social means to a more adequate human 
life. "30 
The imperatives behind the early works of Durant, Edman, Randall, and 
Overstreet, hen, were pragmatic, expressive of the ideals of social recon- 
struction, respectful of scientific method, and dedicated to furthering the 
popularization of knowledge. Similar concerns also permeated the work of 
other middle-ground pragmatists Thomas Vernor Smith and Horace Kallen. 
Smith, trained at the University of Chicago with Mead, intended in his early 
works to strengthen democracy by adopting an experimental stance toward 
social problems. In "The Trend in Philosophy" (1923), Smith summed up 
28 Overstreet, Influencing Human Behavior, 275. James, The Principles of Psychology 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 109-3 1. On habit in James's life and philosophy, see George 
Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher (Baltimore, 1990), 64-72. 
29 Warren I. Susman, "'Personality' and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture," 
in New Directions in American Intellectual History, eds. John Higham and Paul K. Conkin 
(Baltimore, 1979), 212-26. See also, T. J. Jackson Lears, "From Salvation to Self- 
Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930," 
in The Culture of Consumption, ed. Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (New 
York, 1983), 1-38. 
30 Typical reviews of Overstreet's volumes are: Eduard C. Lindeman, "Psychology 
Put to Work," New Republic, 40 (26 May 1926), 40-41; Albert J. Levine, "Influencing 
Human Behavior," The Nation, 122 (5 May 1926), 508-09; Overstreet, Influencing Human 
Behavior, 277. Overstreet's emphasis upon personality as a means of contesting aspects of 
capitalism is strikingly similar to the cult of personality developed by Lewis Mumford, 
Randolph Bourne, and others in this period. See Casey Nelson Blake, Beloved Community: 
The Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, & Lewis 
Mumford (Chapel Hill, 1990). 
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his pragmatic perspective: "Thinking is more and more accepted as exclu- 
sively instrumental instrumental to action and to the immediate values 
thereof."'" 
Kallen had delineated the wide application of pragmatic method in 
William James and Henri Bergson (1914), proclaiming that "pragmatism is
not merely a new name for old ways of thinking; it is a new name for all ways 
of thinking" predicated upon pluralism and perspectivism.32 Kallen popular- 
ized the term "cultural pluralism" in the essay "Democracy versus the 
Melting Pot," (1915) reprinted in his popular collection of essays Culture 
and Democracy in the United States (1924). He presented America in the 
metaphor of an orchestra marked by "a multiplicity ina unity, an orchestra- 
tion of mankind ... in the symphony of civilization ... the range and variety of 
the harmonies may become wider and richer and more beautiful or the 
reverse."33 But whatever the resulting sound, Kallen never demurred from a
willingness to have all particular ethnic groups sing in their own voices. 
However well established their pragmatic pedigree and credentials might 
be, these thinkers increasingly came to a middle-ground position by the mid- 
1920s and early 1930s. The twin Gods of pragmatism, James and Dewey, 
began to share space with other thinkers such as George Santayana nd Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. In using the ideas of these thinkers, middle-ground 
popular pragmatists revised their earlier ideas. At the same time they rein- 
forced their popular image as cosmopolitan thinkers, wedded to the pragma- 
tist tradition, but open to the realities of limitation and tragedy that Santayana 
and Holmes seemed to express. 
Movement oward middle-ground pragmatism happened for a number of 
reasons. Popular pragmatists wanted desperately to be viewed as cosmopoli- 
tan intellectuals. "Cosmopolitanism," as David A. Hollinger uses the term, 
allowed a developing American intelligentsia to think in universalist terms, 
free from the narrowness of particular ethnic identities. In Hollinger's lexi- 
con cosmopolitanism is distinguished from Kallen's "cultural pluralism," in 
which ethnic particularism continued to flourish.34 Both forms of cosmopoli- 
tanism were present among middle-ground pragmatists, but for them cosmo- 
politanism was also an intellectual and cultural style, marked by sophistica- 
tion and wisdom. The intellectual remained actively engaged in public issues 
but in a moderate and restrained manner. 
31 Smith, "Democracy as a Form of Experimentalism," Open Court, 36 (1922), 339- 
45; "The Trend in Philosophy," The Christian Century, 40 (11 Oct. 1923), 1302; 
"Dewey's Theory of Value," The Monist, 32 (1922), 339-54; "Professional Work as an 
Ethical Norm," The Journal of Philosophy, 22 (2 July 1925), 365-72; "Philosophical 
Ethics and the Social Sciences," Social Forces, 7 (1928), 17-24. 
32 Kallen, William James and Henri Bergson (Chicago, 1914), 13. 
33 Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the United States (New York, 1924), 125. 
34 Hollinger, "Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism, and the Emergence of the Ameri- 
can Liberal Intelligentsia," in In the American Province, 56-73. 
ilosophy erican lture
is agmatic rspective: inking ore ore ted lu-
ely strumental-instrumental o ion o he ediate l es
hereof. "31
lineated he i e lication agmatic ethod
il iam a es ri gson ), oclaiming hat ragmatism
t erely a e or s hinking; e a e or s
hinking" edicated n ralism rspectivism.32 ular-
he erm ltural ralism" he cracy rsus he
ing ," ) eprinted is ular lection s lture
cracy he ited ates ). esented erica he
etaphor chestra arked ultiplic ty ity, chestra-
i ind . e phony i . e a ge iety
he armonies ay e i er icher ore ul- he
everse."33 atever he esulting nd, ever ur ed rom
illingness o a e l ticular hnic roups g heir ices.
er ll ablished heir agmatic igre edentials ight
, hese hinkers creasingly e o iddle-ground ition he id-
0s ly 0s. e in s agmatism, ames ,
an o are ace ith her hinkers h rge tayana er
del es, r. i g he eas hese hinkers, iddle-ground
ular agmatist evised heir lier eas. he e i e hey ein-
orced heir lar age opolitan hinkers, ded o he agma-
ist radit on, t o he ealities itation ragedy hat tayana
es ed o res .
ent o ard iddle-ground agmatism a pened or ber
easons. lar agmatist ted erately o ed opoli-
an tellectuals. opolitanism," . inger s he erm,
ed eloping erican telligentsia o hink iversalist erms,
re rom he arrowness ticular hnic entit es. ger's i-
opolitanism istinguished rom 's ltural ralism,"
ich hnic ticularism tinued o lourish. 34 h orms opoli-
anism re esent ong iddle-ground agmatist , t or hem o-
itanism tellectual ltural yle, arked histica-
ion isdom. e tellectual e ained ively gaged blic es
t oderate estrained anner.
1 ith, acy rimentalism," t,
e d il s hy," e istian tury, . ) ;
ry ," e ist, ,339-54; ofes ional k
ical ," e ournal f l sophy, uly ), 72; ilosophical
ics he ces," s, -24.
, il iam a es ri gson o, ), .
, ture racy he ited ates , ), .
i ger, nic sity, opolitanism, he rgence he eri-
al tel igentsia," he erican ince, 73.
294 George Cotkin 
Santayana came to be seen by the popular philosophers as a model of 
cosmopolitan "world weariness" that lent credibility to their need to appear 
as calm, detached observers of the human condition. Santayana appeared 
usefully to correct the buoyant optimism of Dewey; he helped popular 
pragmatists o examine issues of art, faith, and human limitation, which had 
occasionally been exiled to the periphery of pragmatism. Santayana was 
particularly helpful for thinkers such as Edman and Kallen. He took the edge 
off their earnestness for social reconstruction and allowed them to feel 
comfortable as cosmopolitan intellectuals, discoursing about art, challenging 
the dangerous tendencies of "Ku Klux Klanism" for American cultural 
pluralism, and even allowing them to ruminate about the existential nature of 
life.35 
Yet to the popular philosophers in the 1 920s, the appeal of Santayana nd 
Holmes, while sobering, did not destroy or even damage the essentials of 
their pragmatism or political liberalism. Although Santayana has long been 
seen as anathema to pragmatism and liberal politics, Henry Samuel Levinson 
has argued that Santayana was actually a "pragmatic naturalist," whose 
well-known disputes with pragmatists such as James and Dewey obscured 
philosophical affinities.36 Similarly, legal scholar Thomas Grey has made a 
strong case for placing Holmes within the pragmatic tradition, while David 
A. Hollinger has demonstrated the varied reasons for Holmes's popularity 
among liberals.37 The issue at hand is not the validity of these claims. In 
practice middle-ground pragmatists contrived to make Santayana's natural- 
ism become an ally for their pragmatism. Holmes represented for middle- 
ground pragmatists such as Smith an exemplar of the clear-thinking, no- 
nonsense individual, with a sober view of reality. 
Ideas borrowed from Santayana and Holmes also helped to supply the 
popular pragmatists with ammunition to fend off criticisms that had been 
leveled for years against pragmatism by Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck 
Brooks, and Lewis Mumford who considered that among pragmatism's 
deficiencies were James's recourse to the "cash value" metaphor and 
Dewey's support for the First World War. Critics of the "pragmatic acquies- 
cence" also protested against pragmatism's presumed lack of values, instru- 
mentalist and behaviorialist logic, naive faith in scientific method, and lack 
35 Kallen, "Culture and the Ku Klux Klan," in Culture and Democracy, 42. Edman's 
published Arts and the Man (New York, 1928), and a Santayana-style novel Richard Kane 
Looks at Life (London, 1926). Kallen's cultural criticism appeared in Indecency and the 
Seven Arts, and Other Adventures of a Pragmatist in Aesthetics (New York, 1930). His 
chief contribution to aesthetics was his two-volume Art and Freedom (New York, 1942). 
36 Levinson, Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life, passim. 
37 Thomas C. Grey, "Holmes and Legal Pragmatism," Stanford Law Review, 41 
(1989), 787-863, and Hollinger, "The 'Tough-Minded' Justice Holmes, Jewish Intellectu- 
als and the Making of an American Icon," in The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ed. 
Robert W. Gordon (Stanford, 1992), 216-28. 
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of poetic vision. By the 1930s, in the face of totalitarian pressures, charges of 
relativism would be leveled against pragmatist philosophy.38 
These were severe charges, but middle-ground pragmatists believed that 
they could have the best of both possible worlds since their perspective was 
less a philosophical synthesis than a style of cultural criticism. Unlike more 
mercurial temperaments such as Reinhold Niebuhr, whose sense of the 
tragic forced him to dismiss pragmatism middle-ground pragmatists strove 
to be scientific and literary, committed yet distanced, and optimistic yet 
cautious. Middle-ground pragmatists believed they had achieved a cosmo- 
politan angle of vision that allowed them to maintain their cultural authority 
and popularity without jettisoning either political interests or ironic distance. 
Edman was certainly the most forthright popular pragmatist to adopt this 
position. Even in his dissertation, Human Traits, Edman had turned to 
Santayana for guidance on aesthetics and on the instinctual nature of human 
beings. Edman's naturalism was closely tied also to the pragmatic psycho- 
logical tradition.39 He attempted to use the presence of instinct as an indicator 
of the natural imitations placed upon human beings, while also stressing, in 
good pragmatic fashion, that the human mind, through attention and habit, 
need not be bound by instinctual needs. Edman summed up the credo of his 
middle-ground pragmatism as early as 1925: "Nature and life are at bottom, 
if you will, meaningless, blind and chaotic. But they are malleable to an 
intelligence that faces them with candor and courage."40 
Edman's interest in Santayana continued unabated. In the mid-1930s he 
edited the Modem Library edition of The Philosophy of Santayana. In a 
lengthy introduction, Edman crisply accommodated Santayana's doctrines 
with pragmatism. To Edman, Santayana was essentially a moralist, "half 
skeptical, half pragmatic." While Santayana's detachment from moral issues 
in his later work seemed to go too far for Edman, Santayana's "earlier 
concern with the harmonising of impulse," with a naturalistic basis for all 
ideals, and with the consideration that the mind is an "efficacious instrument 
38 Robert Westbrook, "Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, and the 'Pragmatic Acquies- 
cence,"' in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, 301-22. On the relativism charge, see 
Edward W. Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem 
of Value (Lexington, Ky., 1973), 139-58. 
39 On the connections between pragmatism and naturalism, see Harry Todd Costello, 
"The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," and Harold A. Larabee, "Naturalism in 
America," in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant H. Krikorian (New York, 
1944), 295-353. Randall has stated that "Actually, Dewey and Woodbridge were very close 
together philosophically, in all but their very different languages. I long ago gave up trying 
to explain to students the precise difference." Randall, "Towards a Functional Natural- 
ism," in Contemporary American Philosophy, 61. Randall, after his major works of 
popularization, turned increasingly to the history of philosophy, especially Aristotle. See 
his Aristotle (New York, 1960). For an argument hat claims a Deweyan turn to Aristotle, 
see Ralph W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism, 92-94, 97-98. 
40 Edman, "Philosophy for the Lawless," 697. 
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for the realisation of human goods," represented the essential thrust of what 
was useful in Santayana's corpus.4' 
Even Santayana's "patrician" demeanor was valuable since it granted 
him a certain distance from the partisan fray of politics. The worth of 
distance, as Edman interpreted it, allowed Santayana to recognize democracy 
as an ideal, imperfect in practice but capable of improvement. Inone stroke 
Edman had tempered Santayana's pronounced aristocratic proclivities and 
transformed him into a supporter of democracy. Edman could not ignore 
Santayana's increasing interest in "realms of being." Here too he made them 
pragmatic, finding that symbols "both foreshorten a d focus complex expe- 
riences. Symbols become theories, presumptions, hypotheses. They are not 
only friends to free contemplation; they are guides to the harassed human, 
eloquent testimony of things absent and latent as well as vivid and pleasur- 
able sensations of the mind."42 Edman had turned Santayana into a middle- 
ground pragmatist. 
Durant was also attracted to Santayana's world view. He devoted an en- 
tire chapter to Santayana in The Story of Philosophy. In discussing Santa- 
yana, Durant touched upon the familiar: Santayana's poetic soul, epistemo- 
logical skepticism, and naturalism. Durant pragmatized Santayana by argu- 
ing that he, like Dewey, distrusted epistemology. Santayana demanded that 
philosophy, in Durant's words, "come down from these [epistemological] 
clouds, and deal with the affairs of men." Durant was especially moved when 
Santayana called The Life of Reason "'a name for all practical thought and 
action justified by its fruits in consciousness."' Consciousness was in, not 
apart from, "the problems of contemporary life."43 Durant's early activism 
made him somewhat nervous around Santayana, "a man deracine', a Spanish 
aristocrat exiled to middle-class America." Without recognizing a contradic- 
tion with his earlier characterization ofSantayana's notion of consciousness 
as active, Durant criticized Santayana's "sombre withdrawal into himself; 
having taken life out of the world, he seeks for it in his own bosom."44 In 
1926 Durant still wanted his philosophy home-grown, sober yet optimisti- 
cally committed to the important tasks of personal as well as social recon- 
struction. 
41 The Philosophy of Santayana, ed. Irwin Edman (New York, 1936), xiii, xvi. 
42 The Philosophy of Santayana, xviii, xxvii, lvi. Santayana was well aware of Edman's 
using his philosophy for pragmatist ends. When the issue of having Edman as editor for a 
condensed edition of The Life of Reason was raised in the early 1 950s, Santayana noted that 
"Edman would be a more zealous and reliable reviser: but, alas! I think he would retain ... 
all the pragmatisms, dogmatisms, and vulgarities that I should have expunged." Santayana 
to John Hall Wheelock, 24 Aug. 1951 in The Letters of George Santayana, ed. Daniel Cory 
(New York, 1955), 418. 
43 Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 536-3 8. Kallen had praise for Durant's treatment of 
Santayana. See his comments in Dialogue on George Santayana, ed. Corliss Lamont (New 
York, 1959), 93. 
44 Durant, Story of Philosophy, 550, 55 1-53. 
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With publication of Durant's The Mansions of Philosophy in 1927 a new 
view suddenly emerged. Banished was the heady pragmatist optimism about 
social reconstruction that had dominated Philosophy and the Social Problem 
as well as the middle-ground pragmatism of The Story of Philosophy. The 
critique of technical, epistemology-centered philosophy remained, but now 
philosophy promised "total perspective" in the form of wisdom. Philosophy 
might transform "chaos into unity" and thereby achieve a reconstructive 
"healing unity of the soul."45 Such a view, Durant maintained, was in 
consonance with Santayana's emphasis upon the Greek ideal of balance 
among the desires. 
Yet even in this work Durant wanted popular philosophy to furnish 
middlebrow audiences with wisdom and perspective applicable to current 
issues. With a style at once sentimental nd Olympian, Durant discussed the 
fate of the family in an age of changing social realities, the status of women's 
rights, love, aesthetics, and politics. He offered facile, conventional wisdom, 
ending by telling his readers and himself to "straighten our own lives with 
tolerance and honor."46 
Tolerance and honor now appeared as contemplative qualities, less im- 
portant as values that allowed the individual to go forth into politics with 
reformist zeal. Durant preached a philosophy of near-resignation; modera- 
tion, maturity, and contemplation became ends rather than means. Whereas it 
was the stuff of youth to brim with fire and zeal for the problems of the world, 
the mature philosopher preferred to extol the virtues of wisdom as "a light, 
and not a fire; it illuminates the way, but it does not warm the heart, nor stir 
the soul to action."47 
Durant had passed through is Sturm und Drang period. He now wanted, 
as he noted without Voltaire's saving grace of irony, "to cultivate his 
garden." By the late 1920s, moreover, Durant had swooned before the joys 
of fatherhood. In a particularly saccharine chapter, "I Become A Daddy," 
and in a thinly-veiled novel chronicling his life, Transition. A Sentimental 
Story of One Mind and One Era (1927), Durant seemed to have achieved 
peace with himself and the world through the marvelous dividends of father- 
hood and maturity.48 But such recommendations were little more than patent 
medicines of resignation-indices of how far Durant had traveled from 
Dewey's ideals of social reconstruction. Yet even in resignation the ideal of 
the philosopher retained its power. The philosopher was empowered by 
distance from the tensions of the moment. It was unclear whether everyone 
could become a philosopher, but at least they might respectfully sit at the feet 
of great thinkers.49 
45 Durant, The Mansions of Philosophy (New York, 1927), vii-xi. 
46 Durant, Mansions, 426. 
47 Durant, Mansions, 621. 
48 Durant, Transition (New York, 1927). 
49 Durant, Mansions, 624-25. 
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In some ways, Durant's adaptation of Santayana anticipated the highly 
influential A Preface to Morals (1929), in which Walter Lippmann con- 
tended that in the face of the "acids of modernity," modern men and women 
must attempt o develop a "matured personality" and think and act with 
"disinterestedness." In this formulation Lippmann was simply expanding 
upon ideals that he had popularized in the 1920s, when he emphasized that 
the public was inchoate and easily influenced by the media. Democracy in 
such a view was a sham. Only an elite, acting with objectivity and disinterest- 
edness, should make decisions for the body politic. In this belief Lippmann 
and Durant were of one mind. Thus Lippmann's celebration of a stance of 
"disinterestedness" was only a shift in the grounds of argument from a 
strictly political venue to one that was moral and ethical. For Lippmann a 
mature and disinterested view of life might free the individual from 
unfulfilled and unrealistic desires. Accepting fate was useful if one were to 
"go quite simply about the business of the world."50 
Emphasis on moderation and distance did not have to translate, as it had 
for Durant, into a retreat from political engagement or a turn to elitism. After 
all, even Lippmann did not give up the ghost of politics; he simply believed 
that he only dropped utopian aspirations. It was in this sense-and with an 
uncompromising faith in popular democracy- that Thomas Vernor Smith 
read Santayana, Lippmann, and Holmes and assimilated them into his mid- 
dle-ground pragmatism. 
From Santayana, Smith gained, as he noted in his popular The Philo- 
sophic Way of Life (1929), an appreciation for the "aesthetic way of life," for 
poetry and the imagination and a vision of the tragic and ironic elements of 
life. Such perceptions-when tied to Smith's admiration for Santayana's 
"cosmopolitan perspective," marked by "a harmony of himself and with it a 
peace of mind ... matched by kindliness, good humor, and tolerance toward 
others" defined Santayana's appeal. Certainly Santayana offered a power- 
ful vision, but Smith eclectically combined it with the religious communal- 
ism of Josiah Royce, the scientific humanism of William James, and the 
"social way of life" of John Dewey.5' 
Smith came to view philosophy as "wisdom" as much as social recon- 
struction. In middle-ground fashion, wisdom was drained through the filter of 
pragmatism. Wisdom could never be absolute, built upon foundations of 
truth as dogma or even certitude. Meaning was won in a "tentatively and 
fumbling" manner. Maturity and imagination (central to Santayana and 
Lippmann) were balanced with the pragmatist emphasis upon experiment: 
5 Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New York, 1929), 323-30. Lippmann's views on 
the public and the power of communications will be found in his Public Opinion (1922, 
New York; rpt. 1960) and The Phantom Public (New York, 1925). 
5 Smith, The Philosophic Way of Life (Chicago, 1929), 156; "The Role of the 
Philosopher," in Essays in Honor of John Dewey (New York, 1929), 363. 
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"there is no conclusion to philosophy until all life is concluded." With 
James, Smith recommended a strenuous earch for meaning, sobered with 
recognition of the limits placed upon human beings by nature. Out of this 
new sensitivity for limitation and tragedy might arise a judicious reformist 
and democratic way of life.52 
By the mid- I930s Smith's middle-ground pragmatism was dominated by 
themes of creative skepticism, viable doubt, and compromise as the building 
blocks of the democratic and philosophic frame of mind. Many of these ideas 
Smith borrowed from Holmes. One chapter of Creative Sceptics (1934) was 
titled "Doubting One's Way to Democracy: Being a Super-Moral to Justice 
Holmes."53 Smith placed Holmes in the pragmatist camp because he held 
that " 'the workability of ideas' becomes the test, but not the meaning of 
truth." In addition Holmes exemplified middle-ground pragmatism by 
claiming "that no action can be great which is not informed with thought, 
redeemed from smallness by perspective."" 
The consequences of Holmes's doubt and Smith's skepticism were 
"wise tolerance" and a spirit of compromise. Smith conveyed these mes- 
sages to large audiences in his many books, radio programs, as well as 
political speeches. Only through discussion, detachment, and rational argu- 
ment could democracy function. In a period when relativism was being 
condemned as unable to develop suitable principles to oppose totalitarian 
thinking of the right and the left, Smith's middle-ground pragmatism ade 
the process skepticism, tolerance, and compromise more important than 
particular ends. Skepticism as a means, then, was an antidote to dogma and 
intolerance, as well as the basis for democracy.55 
Smith had "learned that compromise is not only goodfor something, but 
it is also a good in itself"56 The compromising spirit was as central in 
philosophical dialogue as in legislative negotiation. Although is experience 
was limited to a brief period as a State Senator in the Illinois Senate in the 
1930s and to a single term as a Congressman-at-large from Illinois in the 
seventy-fourth congress, Smith believed that legislative compromise was the 
preferred course for the solution of America's problems. The perspective 
jibed nicely with the mediative mphasis in Jamesian pragmatism, with the 
social nature of man in Mead's version of pragmatism, and even in Holmes's 
52 Smith, The Philosophic Way of Life, 192, 178. 
53 Smith, Creative Sceptics: In Defense of the Liberal Temper (1934, Freeport, N.Y.; 
rpt. 1972), 177-209. 
54 Smith, Creative Sceptics, 198, 209-10 and "Justice Holmes: Voice of Democratic 
Evolution," in The Philosophy of American Democracy, ed. Charner M. Perry (Chicago, 
1943), 119-52. 
55 Smith, Creative Sceptics, 231. On Smith's relativist defense of democracy, see 
Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory, 208- 1 0. 
56 Smith, A Non-Existent Man, 109. 
ilosophy erican lture
here o clusion o ilosophy til l fe cluded." th
ames, ith eco mended renuous ch or eaning, ered ith
ecognition he its n an i gs ature. his
sitivity or itation ragedy ight ise icious eformist
ocratic fe.52
he id-1 s ith's iddle-ground agmatism inated
hemes eative epticism, i le bt, promise he ilding
ks he ocratic ilosophic rame ind. hese eas
ith rowed rom es. apter eative tics
itled ting o cracy: g r-Moral o ustice
l es."53 ith es he agmatist p se e ld
he rkabil ty ' es he est, t t he eaning
ruth." ition es plified iddle-ground agmatism
ing hat o ion eat ich t formed ith hought,
edeemed rom al nes rspective."54
e sequences es's bt ith's epticism re
ise olerance" irit promise. ith veyed hese es-
es o ge iences is any s, adio ograms, ll
litical eeches. l hrough iscus ion, tachment, ational gu-
ent ld ocracy unction. iod en elativism i g
demned able o elop itable inciples o ose otalitarian
hinking he ight he t, ith's iddle-ground agmatism made
he ocess-skepticism, olerance, ro ise- ore portant han
ticular ds. ticism eans, hen, tidote o a
tolerance, ll he is or ocracy.55
ith ed hat promise t ly or ething, t
self."56 e promis ng irit tral
ilosophical ialogue islative egotiation. hough is erience
ited o ief iod ate tor he i ois ate he
0s o gle erm res man-at-large rom i ois he
enty-fourth gress, ith lieved hat islative promise he
eferred rse or he tion erica's oblems. e spective
icely ith he ediative phasis amesian agmatism, ith he
ial ature an rsion agmatism, es's
52 ith, e l sophic ay f ife, , .
ith, ive tics: fense f he al per , eeport,
pt. ), 7-209.
ith, tive tics, -1 ustice es: ratic
tion," e l sophy f erican racy, . ner . ry o,
), -52.
55 ith, tive tics, . th's elativist ense ocracy,
cel , e isis f ratic eory, 1 .
56 ith, -Existent , .
300 George Cotkin 
vision of distance as democracy's saving grace from "the decadence of 
romanticism."57 When compromise was absent from the political process, 
repression resulted as in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.58 
In 1943 Smith published an expanded version of The Philosophical Way 
of Life in America. He still held to cosmopolitan ideals of tolerance, openness 
to diversity, and compromise: "A man of the world learns how to meet me 
halfway; and, from the vantage point of halfway, to see all the way into their 
characters. His is the resilient spirit."59 Smith's philosophy of compromise 
and empathy would not survive intact he Second World War and the rise of 
communism. After all, as he had phrased it in Creative Sceptics, "Tolerance 
to all the tolerant; and intolerance only in defense of tolerance."60 
By the mid-1930s the essentials of middle-ground pragmatism were in 
place: respect for democracy, liberalism as a "fighting faith" based upon 
skepticism, reasonable tolerance, and an experimental ttitude. In building up 
middle-ground pragmatism, these popular philosophers had included San- 
tayana and Holmes into the pragmatic and liberal traditions in America. The 
resultant perspective was more pastiche than synthesis, but the demands of 
popularization required nothing more. Middle-ground pragmatists mainly 
desired a strong and accessible defense of liberal cosmopolitanism in a world 
beset with problems and challenges. 
Perhaps Edman and Kallen carried these ideals most strongly into the 
decades from the 1930s to the 1950s. Even in the face of the greatest horrors 
of the twentieth century, Edman managed to maintain his equanimity. 
"What," he asked in 1939, "can we do to keep sane in a world gone mad?" 
In a moving piece subtitled "Postscript o Despair" he gained perspective 
from Santayana's naturalism: "Even if our worst fears are realized, Nature 
will still breathe easily, and generate new men in new times to have hopes 
and fears again." Edman found this "no small consolation," for "One of the 
57 Smith, "Justice Holmes: Voice of Democratic Evolution," 120. 
58 Smith, Creative Sceptics, 7-10. 
5 Smith, The Philosophic Way of Life, 217. 
60 Smith, Creative Sceptics, 260. By the late 1940s, Smith had joined other pragmatists 
and former adicals such as Sidney Hook and Overstreet in arguing that freedom of speech 
for communists was dangerous, since communists in America's classrooms would use that 
right to undermine freedom itself. In a host of articles, Smith attempted to defend the 
removal of presumed communists from the University of Washington. For Smith's views, 
see "Academic Expediency as Democratic Justice in re Communists," The American 
Scholar, 18 (1949), 342-53; "Democratic Compromise and the Higher Learning at Se- 
attle," School and Society, 69 (26 Feb. 1949), 137-41. Hook, Heresy, Yes, Conspiracy No 
(New York, 1953), 21-23. For Overstreet's views, see Harry A. Overstreet and Bonaro W. 
Overstreet, Town Meeting Comes to Town (New York, 1938), and Harry and Bonaro 
Overstreet, What We Must Know About Communism (New York, 1958). On the movement 
from the left to the right, see John P. Diggins, Up From Communism: Conservative 
Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York, 1975). 
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advantages of detachment isthat it makes us see how hasty our despairs have 
been, how provincial, even on the human scale, our assumption of tragedy. 
The darkness now seems absolute. Men before us have forgotten that it hides 
the morning star."6' 
Edman could not remain detached; he immediately headed in the direc- 
tion of "the morning star." As America prepared to enter into the Second 
World War, Edman energetically composed Fountainheads of Freedom 
(1941), a book clearly designed to defend the intellectual integrity of liberal- 
ism and the dignity of man: "faith in the human dignity of each man in a 
society of brotherhood and freedom," Edman announced, will survive "the 
flames of destruction."62 
Kallen has been described as "that rare philosopher, a pious pragmatist. 
The James in him is tempered by the Santayana." He became a leading 
spokesman for a liberal pragmatism opposed to totalitarianism inall forms.63 
In a collection of essays published after the war Kallen found Americans 
facing an internal "crisis of freedom." This existential dilemma, Kallen 
argued in the now familiar language of middle-ground pragmatism, "may be 
overcome by faith acting without illusion." This new view was the "fighting 
faith" of liberalism, anchored by an oftentimes unreflective faith in toler- 
ance, pluralism, and experimentalism, and tied to a belief that utopian 
illusions bred intolerance and thus undermined wise social policy.64 
The thought of these largely forgotten thinkers, linking Dewey's ener- 
getic pragmatism and Santayana's distanced skepticism, bore striking affini- 
ties with the chastened liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s as developed most 
famously in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Vital Center (1949), in Lionel 
Trilling's The Liberal Imagination (1950), and in the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Daniel Bell.65 Middle-ground pragmatism did not initially grow 
out of disenchantment with Marxism. The origin for middle-ground pragma- 
tism was shaped by the demands of popularization in 1 920s America and the 
appeal of Santayana's vision of life. These factors combined to allow the 
middle-ground pragmatists to approach public problems with liberal solu- 
tions expressed in the language of philosophical wisdom. 
Whatever problems may be connected with chastened liberalism as a 
61 Edman, Candle in the Dark: A Postscript to Despair (New York, 1939), 88. 
62 With the help of Herbert W. Schneider, Edman published the massive Fountain- 
heads of Freedom (New York, 1941), a defense of democracy and pluralism dedicated to 
Dewey. The quote is found on page 192. 
63 Beryl Levy, Review of Kallen's Individualism: An American Way of Life in Journal 
of Philosophy, 30 (9 Nov. 1933), 640. 
64 Kallen, The Liberal Spirit: Essays on the Problems of Freedom in the Modern World 
(Ithaca, 1948), 8, 29. See also, Kallen, Patterns of Progress (New York, 1950). 
65 On this style of liberalism, see Jumonville, Critical Crossings; Richard H. Pells, The 
Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s (New 
York, 1985); Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1985), and Howard 
Brick, Daniel Bell and the Decline of Intellectual Radicalism (Madison, 1986). 
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political position, middle-ground pragmatists always maintained that philos- 
ophy had a serious function within public culture. As Randall phrased it as 
late as 1963, "Philosophy is not a narrow technical specialty appealing to a 
select few"; it was knowledge consequent o "any responsible and properly 
critical judgment of value."66 This imperative defined the work of the 
middle-ground pragmatists for over forty ears. Perhaps most touching was 
their belief that each individual might be educated to think more deeply and 
tolerantly. In his quaintly appealing and popular autobiography, Philos- 
opher's Holiday (1938), Edman captured this ideal when he recounted his 
associations with everyday, plebeian philosophers. One acquaintance, a well- 
read sailor, studied philosophy seriously, and expected it to offer him the 
wisdom with which to face life.67 If the middle-ground pragmatists in their 
many works of popular philosophy and political theory pushed sailors and 
others to contemplate more seriously the problems of life, then perhaps the 
legacy of these thinkers and the pragmatic tradition becomes more deserving 
of respect, especially when compared with the arcane language that informs 
so much of critical cultural discourse today. 
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. 
66 Randall, How Philosophy Uses Its Past (New York, 1963), 100, 14. 
67 See the chapter, "Philosophers without Portfolio," in Edman, Philosopher's Holi- 
day (1938, New York; rpt. 1956), 146-59. 
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